Participation, Not Paternalism: Moral Education and the Child’s Entry into the Moral Community Abstract: It is commonly assumed that compared with children, adults supposedly possess more mature moral understanding and as such can constitute legitimate grounds for deferring to their moral authority and testimony.In this paper I examine moral philosophical discussions regarding this child-adult moral relation and its implications for moral education, particularly accounts that hold that the moral status of children provide adequate grounds for treating them paternalistically.
Participation, Not Paternalism: Moral Education and the Child’s Entry into the Moral Community Abstract: It is commonly assumed that compared with children, adults supposedly possess more mature moral understanding and as such can constitute legitimate grounds for deferring to their moral authority and testimony.
Though many accounts of upbringing structurally resemble trustee/beneficiary relationships, it remains unclear who grants moral trusts, what their purpose is, how trustees are selected, and even who the proper beneficiaries are.
Absent such information it is difficult to see what, exactly, the trust model is supposed to accomplish, beyond asserting the existence of certain fiduciary relationships without actually justifying them.
I make a case that children can readily meet minimal standards required for moral understanding and engagement especially in everyday moral contexts.
Even when the child has no final say in her moral engagement with an adult, I maintain that there is still a significant normative difference between deferring paternalistically to the adult’s moral testimony and interacting with the child in moral conversation and dialogue.
He works on applied ethics, political philosophy, and philosophy of law.
candidate at Arizona State University’s School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies.together entail that, if justice as fairness is correct, then some interventions on some elements of a society's basic structure are not required (and arguably not permitted) by justice.I claim that among the interventions that are not required (and may not be permitted) are intuitively attractive university reform proposals like the ones sketched above.He has authored one novel for a grade-school audience and is married to #1 Do Children Have “Rights-in-Trust?” Abstract: Do parents hold children’s rights “in trust?I contend that descriptions and justifications of this paternalistic attitude towards children are either unacceptably crude or mistaken.I suggest that while there may be good grounds in certain instances to treat children paternalistically, in the context of moral education the paternalistic attitude is largely irrelevant and even counterproductive.Some of David’s work on these questions is in print in The Limits of Justice as Fairness: The Case of Higher Education Abstract: Many education policy scholars and philosophers of education believe that justice requires significant alterations in current U. This surprising result, I argue, is explained by two internally well-motivated features of justice as fairness, which I call : for social institutions that serve a politically essential function (i.e., institutions which are such that, were they not to exist, a society could not remain in the circumstances of justice), justice as fairness takes these institutions as fixed (even if these institutions tend to frustrate the society’s basic structure satisfying justice as fairness’s requirements), and requires that their effect be compensated for elsewhere in the basic structure.: for associations that are tokens of major social institutions, justice as fairness does not regulate their ‘internal life’ (roughly: their members’ interactions via their associational roles, and the admittance and exclusion of members), so long as the effects of these associations’ ‘internal life’ can be compensated for elsewhere in the basic structure.Recently, Christopher has been awarded the 2017 Philosophy prize essay by the Royal Institute of Philosophy.He has taught philosophy to both high school and college students and looks forward to continue working on his current line of research for his Ph D.